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THE ALGERIA EAST-WEST HIGHWAY: AN INTERIM REPORT 
 
Akira IWABUCHI*, Tsuneyoshi SHIMIZU* 
Kajima Corporation, International Division* 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper is about how a consortium of five Japanese companies (COJAAL: Consortium Japonais Pour 
L’Autoroute Algerienne) is undertaking to build a 399 km, six-lane, limited-access highway across northern 
Algeria.  The paper starts with the bidding process, the evaluation method and the structure of contracts that 
govern the construction of the project on a design-build basis.  Since the contractor is allowed to alter, and 
therefore is responsible for, highway routing to a certain extent, the paper describes how this discretionary 
power was exercised to determine the final location of the highway.  The paper then goes on to outline 
organizational setup, physical and design parameters, procurement and logistics, and construction execution 
plans.  As of February 2009, the contractor is about 29 months into the project, whose duration was 
originally set at 40 months.  The paper highlights events and/or issues that have had time impacts since its 
commencement in September 2006.  Some sections of the project have faced major landslides.  Other 
sections are being impacted by a shortfall of critical materials such as crushed gravels for pavement.   The 
contractor also experienced complications from having to build a project to the French standard when natural 
conditions in Algeria do not necessarily lend themselves to the French standard.  Sourcing and mobilizing 
labor from out-of-the-country markets in sufficient numbers and having them work efficiently on a stretch of 
construction sites extending over hundreds of kilometers have added to the task of coordination and control.   
As such, the paper represents an interim report on, and a case study of, managerial and technical challenges 
that an overseas project of this magnitude and scope can present to the contractor, as well as approaches that 
can be taken to meet such challenges. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In September 2006 a consortium of Japanese 
contractors (Cojaal: Consortium Japonais Pour 
L’Autoroute Algerienne) signed a ¥5.4 billion 
design-build contract for a 399 km eastern section of 
the Algeria East-West Highway, one of the largest 
civil construction projects ever to be undertaken by 
one entity in the history of the Japanese construction 
industry.  
 
The award was a result of international biddings 
conducted by the Algeria Public Works Ministry in 
January 2006 to build out a contiguous 1,200 km 
East-West Highway from the Moroccan border to the 
Tunisian border.  The Ministry divided up the 
Highway into three sections of approximately equal 
size, with Chinese contractors coming out as the 
winners of the western and central sections.  Of the 
six bidders who competed for the eastern section, 
Cojaal bid the highest.  Bid evaluation assigned 60 
points to technical and 40 points to financial. Cojaal 
succeeded in tipping the scale largely on the strength 
of technical merits that it earned for a crash 
construction program utilizing global positioning 
systems, and contingency planning for the 
earthquake hazard. 
 
Figure 1.1 gives an outline of the Project, while 
Table 1.1 details the structure of contracts as well as 
 
Figure 1.1 Project Outline 
 
Table 1.1 Structure of Contracts 
 
how each contract defines contractor’s design-build 
responsibilities.  Of particular note is the 
contractor’s right to propose alternative routes over 
large stretches of the Highway. 
 
 
 
Lot #  12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4-2-2 4-2-1 4-1 3 2 1 
Camp  1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
Distance (km)  37.8 27.6 46.9 30.0 27.1 17.0 13.0 9.6 3.1 36.3 44.0 39.0 84.0
Category #  I in Service I II III III 
Conceptual Design APS Completed - - Completed 1 1 
Preliminary Design APD Completed - - Completed by Emp 1 1 
Modification of APD APD 1 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 1 2 - - 
Leveling of Design LVL 1 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 1 2 - - 
Execution Design DEX 1 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 
Construction  1 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 
APS: Apres Projet Sommaire 
APD: Apres Projet Detaille 
DEX: Dossier d'Execution 
Contract #1 Initial Contract 
Contract #2 Quotaion for Contract #2 is submitted after the completion of APD by the Employer, and then Contract 
Contract #3 Quotaion for Contract #3 is submitted after the completion of APD included in Contract #1, and then Contract 
 Numbers in grayed cells correspond to Contract numbers. 
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As of February 2009, Cojaal is approximately 29 
months into the 40 month project.  In what follows, 
the paper describes how Cojaal set itself up to handle 
this enormous undertaking, and what it encountered 
once the project got under way.  As such, this is an 
interim report on managerial and technical 
challenges that an overseas project of this magnitude 
and scope can present to the contractor, as well as 
approaches that can be taken to meet such 
challenges.  
 
2. HIGHWAY ROUTING 
 
The ¥5.4 billion contract amount was introduced at 
the last stage of contract negotiations with the 
Employer  as a cut-off point for the aggregate 
payments that Cojaal is entitled to receive in 
exchange of completing a yet-to-be-designed 
Highway whose routes are subject to change. The 
only exceptions are cost and time associated with 
variation orders, force majeure, and other causes 
attributable to the Employer.   
 
Preliminary studies by Cojaal revealed that moving 
the Highway from its initial route through the coastal 
mountains to the edge of the coastal plains 
northward would eliminate tunnels as well as high 
bridges across ravines.  These cost savings, 
however, needed to be weighed against impacting 
towns and villages along the alternative routes and 
having to spend time devising, negotiating and 
implementing mitigations.   
 
In anticipation of this, Cojaal negotiated a special 
contract provision that compensated the contractor 
for time and cost arising out of extended delays in 
obtaining approvals.  
 
When Cojaal accepted this “price ceiling,” it 
essentially took it upon itself the challenge to choose 
Highway routes and to develop subsequent design 
details such that, barring force majeure and other 
exceptions, the Highway can be executed on time 
and project cost can come in below the price ceiling.    
 
3. PROJECT EXECUTION 
 
This Chapter summarizes how the Project was 
initiated and managed at site, highlighting issues of 
time management as well as quality control. 
 
The members of Cojaal recognized that key success 
factors in this regard are procurement and logistics 
(P/L) and design management (D/M). 
  
3.1 Organizational Setup 
Project organization adopted involves seven site 
offices, called “Camps,” each of which is to 
construct a section of the Highway that varies in 
length from 12.7 km to 123 km. The Headquarters 
(H/Q) coordinates, controls and integrates the 
activities of the Camps as shown in Figure 3.1.  
Each Camp internally replicates the functions that 
H/Q has, such as Contract Administration and 
Design Management. 
 
Design within the scope of Cojaal is outsourced to 
internationally recognized design firms.  The 
design process is managed by staff dispatched from 
the members of Cojaal. 
 
3.2 Construction Execution 
The Camps execute construction of the assigned 
work scopes independently, based on work budgets 
and programs that have been agreed upon at 
meetings presided by the H/Q. 
 
With the exception of Camp 7, each Camp is 
operated by one member of Cojaal.  For instance, 
Camps 2 and 4 are operated by Kajima Corporation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 COJAAL’s Organization 
 
alone.  This setup gives each member company 
managerial autonomy, allows aggressive application 
of proprietary technologies, and most importantly, 
provides a strong incentive to achieve good results 
for the company, contributing to Cojaal’s overall 
success. 
 
As Camp 7 was to commence last, it is operated by 
an internal joint venture where the members of 
Cojaal can pull together their experiences from their 
own Camps and expedite work progress.  
 
3.3 Procurement and Logistics 
Timely procurement of plant, equipment and major 
materials is a prerequisite to on-schedule work 
progress. 
 
3.3.1 Plant and Equipment Procurement 
Since aggregates, cement concrete, and asphalt 
mixtures shall be manufactured by Cojaal, all 
necessary plant and relevant equipment were 
globally procured early on.  So were earthwork 
heavy equipment, passenger vehicles and other 
common equipment. 
 
In order to meet a demanding time-schedule, huge 
volumes of cargo were rushed in the initial stage to 
the Port of Skikda, the closest and most convenient 
port of entry. 
 
Table 3.1 exhibits a procurement schedule of such 
major plant and equipment which were 
purchase-ordered to vendors during the first seven 
months immediately after signing the contract.  The 
countries of origin range from Japan, North America, 
Europe to South East Asia. 
 
Table 3.1 Procurement Schedule of Major Plant & 
Equipment during the first Seven Months 
Plant/Equipment Q’ty Countries of Origin 
Batching Plant 10 Japan, China, Italy, 
Singapore 
Crushing Plant 
(Fixed & Mobile) 
14 Japan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, France 
Asphalt Plant  3 Italy 
Passenger Vehicle 
(Bus, Pickup, SUV) 
307 
 
Japan, Thailand, 
Morocco 
Cement Lorry (Tanker) 17 Japan 
Fuel Lorry (Tanker) 42 Japan 
Agitator Truck 127 Japan 
Dump & Cargo Truck 466 
 
Japan, India, 
France, Sweden 
Earthwork Equipment 
(Shovel, Bulldozer, 
Loader, Roller, etc) 
400 Japan, USA, France, 
Germany,  
200ton Wheel Crane 4 Japan, Germany 
Concrete Pump on 
Truck 
20 Japan, Singapore, 
Germany 
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The total volume of plant and equipment shipped to 
Algeria from various countries amounts to 
110,000FT during this first seven months, out of 
230,000FT during 28 months until December 2008.  
The value of the first seven-month procurement 
exceeds 20 billion Yen, or 220 million USD. 
 
The P/L mission has been carried out with diligent 
preparations and particular care taken to: 
 
1) Purchase-order to plural vendors a single item at 
a time to procure a large quantity in short period. 
2) Manage delivery of the items to warehouses at 
original ports to effectively utilize deck spaces 
of cargo vessels 
3) Call well in advance cargo vessels bound for or 
via Algeria, whose availability is quite limited. 
4) Make up complete shipping/import documents to 
facilitate customs clearance. 
5) Hire effective stevedores; experienced custom 
brokers; and inland forwarders to unload and 
transport the cargo out of the port in a timely 
manner. 
6) Communicate well within the P/L team located 
both at H/Q, the consignee; and at Tokyo back 
office, the shipper. 
 
3.3.2 Materials Procurement 
An initial assumption that major materials such as 
aggregates, cement, reinforcing bars, concrete pipes, 
and bitumen, etc., can be procured easily from local 
sources turned out to be inaccurate: 
 
1) Aggregate 
The planned Highway route provided distant 
views on both sides of a number of mountains 
being actively quarried, which led Cojaal to 
attempt to purchase from the operators of those 
quarries the necessary quality and quantity of 
aggregates.  This effort was given up due to 
disagreement over the conditions offered by the 
operators. 
 
The second and adopted option was for Cojaal to 
operate crushing plants at quarries and produce 
the aggregates.  However, some quarries turned 
out after some trials to produce limestone 
aggregates that did not meet the specifications in 
terms of Los Angeles Abrasion Test results. 
 
The engineers from the Camps and the P/L team 
collaboratively explored satisfactory quarries, 
and the last necessary quarry was identified only 
recently.  This time-consuming quarry hunting 
has resulted, in part, in the procurement of a 
large number of crushing plants as shown in 
Table 3.1. 
 
2) Cement 
Since Algerian mountains are constituted 
primarily of limestone, ERCE, a government 
agency, operates a number of cement factories. 
Although the quality is satisfactory, the quantity 
is not enough.  As a result, cement lorries 
dispatched from the Camps routinely wait for 
cement loading for several hours in a line at the 
factories.  Consequently, a cement lorry can 
make only one trip for cement transportation a 
day, leading to less stock in silos than was 
planned. 
 
This situation aggravates in summer time when 
production drops due to the “Vacance,” similar 
to what happens in Western Europe.  Some 
busy Camps have responded by stockpiling 
cement in “Ton Bags” in well conditioned 
warehouses two months before summer vacation 
starts. 
 
3) Reinforcing Bar 
The specifications for the rebars are in 
accordance with the French standard, which is 
unfamiliar to non-European suppliers.  Thus, 
the number of foreign suppliers that Cojaal can 
use is limited. 
 
It was fortunate that an international steelmaker 
operates a steel mill in Algeria, and that rebars 
using the French standard were available locally 
through their official distributors. 
 
The problem was the handling of the rebars at 
the distributors’ warehouses.  Poor inventory 
management has made it difficult to identify 
rebar specifications such as strengths and 
diameters. 
 
Thus, the P/L team was forced to procure 
specified rebars from reliable Italian suppliers at 
the beginning. 
 
Similarly, Cojaal has experienced problems with 
many other materials that were locally procured. 
 
3.4 Design Time Management 
Design time management is critical to the overall 
management of time for a design-build project.  
When design is not finalized and fixed on time, 
subsequent activities such as procurement and 
construction can not be carried out according to 
schedule.  Benefits of fast track or phased 
construction often sought in the design-build scheme 
are thus predicated on successful time management 
of the design process.   
 
3.4.1 Design Information Flow 
Figure 3.1 also shows Cojaal’s design organization. 
H/Q’s design management team and Camps’ design 
team collaborate with outside design firms. 
 
The Employer also hires his own design consultants 
as “Technical Advisor” and “The Engineer.”  They 
are the counterpart of Cojaal’s design management 
team. 
 
Figure 3.2 exhibits the flow of design information 
exchange among the design-related organizations in 
case of LEVELING and DEX.  The LEVELING is 
the matter of “Technical Advisor” and the DEX is of 
“The Engineer” in the Employer’s organization.  
The design is finalized when the DEX is approved. 
 
The DEX approval procedure is summarized in 
Figure 3.3.  The DEX can be approved in a 
minimum of 15 days if the Engineer does not find in 
the submitted DEX draft any major deviations from 
the Employer’s requirements in the Contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Flow Diagram of Design Information for 
LEVELING (APD) and DEX 
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Figure 3.3 Flow Diagram of Approval Procedure for 
DEX 
 
3.4.2 Difficulties in Design Time Management 
Cojaal has found it difficult to manage design time in 
this Project. Uncontrollable and/or unexpected 
events and circumstances have affected the design 
process, in more ways than Cojaal ever expected.  
Approvals of the designs presented to the Employer 
(the Engineer and Technical Advisor) were anything 
but timely or forthcoming. 
 
The difficulties which Cojaal has faced include: 
 
1) Limited availability of original APSs & APDs, 
2) Sparsely located original bore-hole logs, 
3) Environmental restrictions unknown to the 
Bidder (prospective Design/Builder), 
4) Technical Specifications particular to this 
Project, 
5) Unfamiliar standards (the French standard) 
frequently referred to in the Specifications, 
6) Inconsistency time-to-time in the Design 
requirements and preferences, 
7) Lack of prompt Employer responses to the 
Contractor’s submission, 
8) Magnitude of the Project 
9) Design Firms located outside Algeria 
10) Disagreements with the international design 
firms 
11) Reconciling construction requirements with 
design requirements 
12) Pursuit of cost effectiveness in the design phase 
under the price ceiling 
13) Scarcity of experienced in-house design 
managers 
14) Ruling French language 
 
3.4.3 Design/Build scheme : from the 
Contractor’s View  
Textbook arguments for and against the D/B scheme 
typically look like the following: 
 
1) The Contractor can incorporate its innovative 
technologies and constructability in the design, 
leading to reductions in cost & time, 
2) Overall project time can be reduced to the extent 
that “Fast Track” or “Phased Construction” is 
possible, 
3) “Checks and balances” does not work well 
between the designer and the contractor because 
both functions are integrated in one entity, 
4) The Employer needs to take strong control of 
project expenditures so as not to allow the cost 
to exceed the budget, 
and so forth. 
 
The experiences by Cojaal, however, suggest that 
benefits of design-build can vary greatly depending 
on the following circumstances: 
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1) The design/builder proposing to utilize its 
innovative technologies for time/cost reductions 
often meets with resistance from outside design 
firms because the latter are afraid of liabilities 
that may arise from adopting such innovative 
technologies. 
2) Design time management is a complicated task, 
often leading to delays in design progress.  In 
such cases, the benefits of fast track or phased 
construction are elusive.  
3) The Employer has the ultimate right to approve 
design and construction, meaning that the 
Employer’s review and/or approval rights affect 
all activities of the design/builder. The degree to 
which this relationship can work to slow or 
expedite project progress may exceed contractor 
expectations. 
 
4. CURRENT ISSUES IMPACTING TIME 
 
Of the events that impacted on-site work progress 
since construction commenced, two things stand out: 
landslides and a shortage of aggregates.  
 
4.1 Landslides 
Part of the Highway traverses an extended terrain 
characterized by limestone-marl formations.  Cojaal 
did not anticipate the degree to which 
partially-weathered marl in this area is susceptible to 
landslides.  After excavation started on the tunnels 
in this section of the Highway, construction stalled in 
the face of extensive landslides around tunnel 
entrances and where hillsides were cut for the 
project. 
 
Mitigation measures included moving the location of 
tunnel entrances, constructing embankments or 
driving long piles that can hold the weight of marly 
formations on the slopes above, and installing 
drainage channels through the marl. 
 
4.2 Shortage of Aggregates 
Production of aggregates suffered not only from 
difficulty of finding suitable quarries but also from 
restricted supplies of explosives.  The latter was 
due to strict controls on the distribution of explosives 
for security reasons:  regulations require that any 
transportation of explosives from the only source 
available near the western section of the Highway to 
the quarries be attended by armed official guards, 
and all explosives be used up while the guards are in 
attendance at the quarry.  
 
This places severe constraints on the production of 
concrete and crashed gravels for pavement, and 
limits the amount of blasting for tunnel excavation. 
Cojaal is applying for a special permit to build 
explosives stockpiles.  The location of such storage 
facilities is still being negotiated.  
 
4.3 Construction Standards and Specifications 
The Employer has adopted construction standards 
and specifications (CCTP) that are conceived along 
the French standard.  CCTP not only requires 
testing methods and performance measures that are 
unfamiliar to Cojaal, but also imposes restrictions 
that are often at odds with local conditions in 
Algeria. 
 
As a case in point, CCTP discourages the use of 
limestone aggregates in the surface course asphalt 
mixtures when in fact the only aggregates locally 
available in large enough quantities are of limestone.  
The issue is insufficient hardness of local limestone.  
As a result, a solution being proposed by Cojaal is to 
mix blast furnace slag or hard sandstone with 
limestone aggregates to improve the 
abrasion/corrosion resistance. 
 
Cojaal continues to encounter situations where it 
finds CCTP impractical or uneconomical, given local 
conditions.  Cojaal’s approach has been to devise 
alternative means or methods that Cojaal deems to 
be “equivalent,” and to attempt to convince the 
Engineer to adopt them.  Cojaal is assisted in this 
effort by a committee of experts formed in Tokyo 
that regularly convenes and advises on technical 
solutions. 
 
4.4 Labor Management 
Cojaal found that the Employer often had issues with 
the qualifications of subcontractors that Cojaal had 
chosen to bring in from foreign countries.  It was 
also time-consuming to obtain visas for imported 
labor. 
 
Supervising groups of labor that are positioned far 
apart along the Highway has proven to be 
demanding especially when the distance involved 
can be 50 km or more.  Workers who are rushed to 
move between work locations using two-lane local 
highways or partially completed roads are prone to 
engage in unsafe driving practices, which have led to 
some fatal accidents. 
 
The task of on-site labor management is often 
compounded by an apparent lack of sufficient 
supervisory capacity on the part of the Employer.  
On-site progress suffers and confusion ensues when 
the Employer does not dispatch someone to either 
attend the testing or approve construction work that 
is ready for inspection. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Cojaal signed on the ¥5.4 billion contract for the 
Algeria East-West Highway with a full realization 
that it was a crash construction program on an 
unprecedented scale.  While it may not have been 
typical for a design/builder to commit to a fixed sum 
when the design was so incomplete, Cojaal regarded 
the design-build features – including contractor’s 
discretionary right to alter the Highway routes – as a 
lever with which to make the Project work as a 
business proposition.  It was a judgment call based 
on much analysis at the time and strong 
commitments from its members.   
 
Working with a foreign government Employer on a 
design-build project based on unfamiliar 
construction standards and specifications has so far 
been more than challenging; yet the members of 
Cojaal are bringing all their expertise and resources 
to bear on the Project in order to succeed. 
 
 
 
